We argue that an analytic proportionality assessment balancing usefulness and burden on individual or group privacy must be conducted throughout the design process to create acceptable ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) applications and services. We introduce the principle of proportionality, which originates within the legal and data protection communities. Inspired by this principle, we develop a design method for ubicomp applications, based on our own experience, and aimed at HCI practitioners and designers. We discuss the method in relation to real-world examples, user inquiry techniques and requirements engineering models. Finally, we report a sample application of the method, involving a ubiquitous, personal memory aid tool.
INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, privacy has become a fundamental concern of the ubiquitous computing (ubicomp) research agenda. This heightened interest for privacy can be attributed to various factors, but it is widely acknowledged that assessments of what constitutes a threat to privacy vary over time and depend on social and cultural contexts [31] . These cultural and temporal differences and the rapid change of technology are among the reasons why a general understanding of privacy still eludes us and design techniques for privacy lack effectiveness and generality.
Despite some attempts to adapt general privacy-enhancing principles (e.g., information minimization) to ubicomp design, most notably by Langheinrich [23] , researchers in the ubicomp field typically approach threats to privacy in connection with individual applications or technologies, which results in ad hoc solutions based on modifications to the design or usage modalities that only work with the application at hand (e.g., work by Greenberg et al. [7, 28] and Hudson and Smith [19] ).
This focus on individual applications overlooks a longstanding experience in the domain of technology policy, as suggested by Lessig [25] . Indeed, a vast body of knowledge regarding the impact of technology on individual privacy rights has grown over the past century in rulings and opinions issued by courts and, more recently, data protection authorities (DPA)-supervisory entities with regulatory and enforcement powers on data protection matters. Over time, the legal community has developed a 'toolset' used for determining the merits and acceptability of a specific technological instance. Among these tools, principles guide both legislation and its interpretation. This article will consider specifically the principle of proportionality, as used in the legal community in reference to privacy. From the general principle we develop a design method for ubicomp that provides formative guidelines for design, and can be used to compare alternatives within a very complex design space. This design method is specifically tailored for ubicomp applications, such as those being developed at Georgia Tech's Aware Home, and by the Equator effort. 1 These applications run autonomously and unsupervised, are embedded in environments of human action, and are based on sensing large amounts of information from such environments. While our method could be used for designing applications in marketing, financial services, healthcare or ecommerce, a design process such as the one proposed here might not be necessary for them, because they are, by now, quite well understood and a wide range of solutions is provided by regulation and industry best practice (e.g., [10, 34, 36] ). Conversely, the novelty, complexity and grade of threats posed by ubicomp, and specifically by sensing and data retrieval, do require designers to apply a much more fine-grained and exploratory design approach. In the absence of appropriate judicial, DPA and industry practice, designers must adopt a reflective and preventive attitude not only to fulfill ethical responsibility [5] and address potential liability concerns, but also because it improves application acceptance and success with regard to social interests [37] and norms [33] .
RELATED WORK
We make here some general comments on work related to ours. Specific work is cited below, where appropriate. The issue of individual privacy rights in ubicomp design has been long present to researchers. Bellotti and Sellen published early work in the context of "awareness" and videoconferencing services in which privacy issues are addressed by providing appropriate feedback and control over the technology [4] . More recent work on privacy and awareness systems includes Greenberg's et al. and Hudson and Smith's [7, 19, 28] . We espouse their attention to detailed interface design in our method. The concept of feedback is also central to Palen and Dourish's description of interpersonal privacy as a continuous negotiation process. Interfaces must be carefully designed to enable such dynamics [31] , and our method is intended to help in this regard.
Among more general design techniques, Langheinrich proposed guidelines based on the Fair Information Practices (FIPS) [30, 35] to drive privacy-enhanced design [23] . Jiang et al., drawing from economic and information theories, propose asymmetric information flows, an approach to privacy-enhanced design in which privacy tensions are managed by modulating persistency, accuracy and confidence in information within an information system [21] . Although these principles all intend to provide guidelines to inform design, the lack of a design process model constrains their applicability; we use some of the ideas they propose, but insert them in a comprehensive design process that indicates when and how to use them.
Chung et al. have applied the concept of design patterns to privacy problems in ubicomp [9] . Our experience suggests that, while general design guidelines like patterns are helpful in many cases, only thorough analysis of design features on a case-by-case basis can provide strong arguments for an application's acceptability. Our design process is more flexible because design features are modeled as variables that can be composed with one another.
Finally, our approach draws from the concept of multilateral security [27] , developed for analyzing systems with multiple competing security threats. Rannenberg documents how user studies can help to design mobile applications with multilateral security requirements in workplaces [32] . Multilateral security asserts that designers must account for all stakeholders' needs and concerns, by considering and negotiating conflicts, respecting individual interests, and supporting user sovereignty. We tackle aspects that multilateral security does not address; specifically, we: 1) show how the requirements compromise process can be structured; 2) provide a grounding in legal practice; and 3) expand the scope of analysis to technologies that do not necessarily afford intentional interaction (i.e., ubicomp).
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
In its simplest form, the principle of proportionality states that any application, system, tool or process should balance its utility with the rights to privacy (personal, informational, etc.) of the involved individuals. This very general principle is similar to the Fair Information Practices, and specifically it resembles the Data Quality practice:
"Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date." [ 30, §8] Proportionality, however, differs in one important aspect from Data Quality, in that it establishes a balance between the usefulness of the considered application and its effects on privacy, whereas the FIPS only impose conditions on the collection and use of information in relation to the data subject's consent, and to the needs of the application. In this sense, the FIPS reflect how system analysts designed potentially intrusive IT in the Seventies, while proportionality reflects how people might think about technology impacting everyday life [2, 26] . Given their popularity, the FIPS have been used as a basis to devise design guidelines for ubicomp applications [14, 23] . However, while clearly necessary, today the FIPS are not anymore sufficient for providing comprehensive design guidance, because they only suggest to evaluate if data collection is commensurate with the goal of the application. They do not tell whether an application is useful, acceptable to its stakeholders, and commensurate to the burden on its stakeholders' privacy.
Recent data protection regulation does incorporate the concept of proportionality between utility of data collection and its burden on privacy. European Union Directive 95/46/EC (the baseline for all EU Members' data protection laws) states that "personal data may be processed only if … processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed" [13 §7(f) , italics by the authors]. Assessing legitimacy requires a balance between benefit of data collection and the interest of the data subject (the person whom the data refers to) in controlling the collection and disclosure of personal information. European DPAs have expanded and clarified the proportionality principle by providing opinions on applications of automated sensing technology, e.g., video surveillance on commercial premises and private dwellings [11] , and biometric technology in both governmental and commercial settings [12] . The British Institute of International and Comparative Law compiled a summary of DPA rulings on video surveillance across the EU [8] .
This balancing of interests is, of course, not unique to the European data protection community. Court rulings in the United States, including Supreme Court rulings, employ similar assessments. For example, opinions involving the "chilling" effects on First Amendment rights of surveillance in public space (e.g., during public demonstrations) [3, p. 168] point out a balancing between a law enforcement interest in preventing crime or unrest and individuals' rights to free expression. A case involving illegal wiretapping of cell phone conversations, (Bartnicki v. Vopper, 2001 , cited in [33] ) shows that arguments on the impact of technology on privacy are based on balancing of contrasting rights. Furthermore, the concept of reasonable expectation of privacy (as developed by the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 1967, [22] ) implies a proportionality judgment on the phenomenological qualities of sensing technologies.
The principle of proportionality is widely used across legal contexts to balance technology and privacy. We limit our study to EU and US laws because the abundant literature and reflective stance in these jurisdictions lend themselves well to our analysis. Privacy laws in many other parts of the world resemble either model. However, court rulings and DPA opinions are extremely general and do not provide operative guidance to designers, because they emphasize summative and technology-neutral critique. Our contribution consists of a structured, flexible design method for ubicomp applications, inspired by legal and technology policy evaluation, but based on our own experience and aimed at HCI practitioners. While it may be impossible to achieve unanimity among the users and designers of any one application, this method helps to structure design and its justification on documented and rigorous reasoning.
FROM PRINCIPLE TO METHOD
Design is about making decisions, progressing from a problem statement to a solution, and it is commonly acknowledged that privacy must be addressed from the early stages of this process. In attempting to cast the principle of proportionality within a design framework, therefore, we have to account for that decision process. We present a method that begins with the driving motivation from the principle of proportionality, the establishment of usefulness or legitimacy, and proceeds toward a systematic refinement to whittle down design alternatives in the face of privacy considerations. The three stages (which we will call "judgments") of our method are:
• Legitimacy-Establish that the application goals would be useful for the intended user population.
• Appropriateness-Recommend the best alternative from a variety of technology (and non-technology) solutions.
• Adequacy-Even with a given technology solution, there are many parameters that can be adjusted, and each should be examined to justify proper use. (Fig. 1) The terms legitimacy and appropriateness derive from the analyses typically performed by DPAs, while adequacy refers to the fine-grained activity of interface and information designers. The following discussion of the three stages is not intended to be exhaustive. Rather, our goal is to suggest how the three stages can be approached and to point out which sources and techniques we found useful in making design decisions at each stage.
Note that legal constraints are taken into account during this design process as context-dependent requirements, during all three stages of the process. However, often the three judgments outlined above must be made independently from (or as a function of) a determination of legality in a given jurisdiction, because legal constraints differ across legal contexts, and the uncharted waters of ubicomp often lack legislative constraints. To determine whether a specific application is legitimate, one must show that the interest in using it for a specific purpose (e.g., a home security system) justifies the burden on individuals' rights and any other externalities (e.g., unrelated passersby, visitors). A legitimacy judgment can be complicated due to the difficulty of employing quantitative measures. In most cases, however, the determination must be argued qualitatively, which can be problematic given competing interests in the market potential for a given application and the skill set and knowledge required to carry out a convincing judgment. In many cases, DPAs and courts address the issue by structuring the problem along the following three questions:
• What is the purpose of the application?
• What are the advantages gained? (e.g., expressed in reduction of risk, or economical benefit) • What is the imposed burden? (e.g., in terms of changes of behavior, "chill effect," or other social costs)
The purpose of use of an application is closely related to its intended benefits, and thus is integral to the legitimacy assessment. For example, the French DPA allowed a video surveillance system with license plate recognition for increasing customs control accuracy and throughput. In contrast, the DPA did not allow a very similar system, intended for increasing quality of service on motorways, because the benefits (improved congestion management) were not deemed to outweigh the potential effects of large-scale tracking of private vehicles on internal motorways [8] .
Applications that are acceptable for one purpose and illegitimate for another are carefully evaluated and DPAs usually set requirements in order to embed them in a deployment environment capable of preventing abuse (e.g., by requiring organizational oversight, and explicit allocation of responsibility). These additional requirements are often expressed on a per-industry basis by DPAs, but designers could impose more limited organizational and deployment requirements (e.g., differentiating across user groups…).
While identifying the advantages gained might be as simple as reviewing the application motivation, imposed burden may be more difficult to determine. From a multilateral security perspective, a standard security threat analysis can yield good results, although quantifying threats might prove difficult. In some instances, it might be possible to calculate the benefits and burdens through risk analysis, as done by Hong et al. [18] , assuming that the designer's goal is that of minimizing global risk at the social level, which might not always be the case [20] .
A qualitative argument might be the only viable option. A variety of methods can be employed to gather evidence for this purpose. Standard legal priority determinations (e.g., economic advantage is subordinate to freedom of speech) can be used. Moreover, judgments made by courts on similar applications, which legal literature provides, can provide helpful analogies. In the case study presented below, involving the merits of a service employing environmental audio recording, we referenced court cases involving wiretapping and environmental video recording (e.g., [11, 22] ), and literature on the perception of public space and proxemics [16] .
In addition to reflecting on existing literature, direct, indepth knowledge of the affected users' opinions, needs, and options, does provide qualitatively more convincing evidence in favor or against an application's legitimacy. To this end, surveys can be used for gaining preliminary feedback on an application concept. However, privacy is an elusive subject: the behavior of people often differs from what they say when asked about it [1] . In light of this, we have come to question the descriptive power of privacy surveys, even accounting for their cost advantages. Studies that probe users more closely, such as focus groups, experience sampling or ethnographic observation, produce better results. In addition to providing grounding for determining legitimacy, such studies help to understand how users might adopt the application, and its social effects. While a dedicated study may be overly costly, our experience shows that in many cases it is possible to address salient privacy questions piggybacking on general user studies.
Appropriateness
Once the legitimacy of a certain application has been positively argued, the appropriateness of the alternative implementing technologies or techniques must be evaluated. Cost and practicality are obviously important co-determinants in this assessment. In brief, the main questions of an appropriateness determination are:
• Appropriateness of a certain technological choice can be argued similarly to legitimacy, by drawing from sociology, legal reference, user studies, etc. However, since the focus is now the implementing technology and not the general goal of an application, the argument is made at a lower level, usually comparing alternative technologies, or different architectures within a certain technical domain.
While different technologies can be used to attain an application goal, not all technologies have the same effects on privacy. As a practical example of this, consider security systems: audio recording is in many cases considered more invasive than video. This thinking is mirrored by a 2002 opinion given by the Swedish DPA which disallowed an invehicle security system in taxis employing audio recording, whereas it permitted digital pictures of passengers to be taken at the moments when they entered and left the car [8] .
Technological choices must be taken considering not only the technical merits but also the wider social ramifications (in what Latour calls socio-technical hybrids [24] ). For example, an ethnographic study of video surveillance operators conducted in England [29] in the mid-1990's showed that members of minorities and conspicuously dressed people were more often targets of surveillance than ordinary looking people, effectively creating a double standard, to the detriment of crime prevention. Finally, designers often overlook non-technical solutions for meeting a certain goal. For example, research conducted in the 1980's and 1990's on graffiti and vandalism prevention strategies showed that the installation of surveillance cameras is not necessarily the only or best solution: cleaning graffiti promptly or enacting prevention programs instead provides equally good results [15] .
The selection of the appropriate technology might contrast with the designer's preference in terms of implementation cost, and might also reduce flexibility for future development, which is typically a desirable feature. Even excluding design flexibility, applications are unavoidably appropriated by their users in ways not foreseen by developers. However, from the proportionality standpoint, emergent uses are a liability because they unsettle a delicate design balance. This design method, together with prototyping, ethnographic design, and summative evaluation can help to understand the deployment environment to circumscribe, deter or at least predict abuse. The outcome of legitimacy and appropriateness determinations is thus not necessarily binary. Rather, it results in the definition of management, deployment, and usage conditions, of corrective or balancing measures, and in the revision of the application goals.
Adequacy
As the design process deals with increasingly fine-grained aspects of the application, we now turn to the qualities of the chosen application and technology, which must be adequate to the application goals and acceptable to all stakeholders. This task is challenging, because the design space can expand to include many interdependent features, such as interface affordances, information policies and internal parameters. Further, while traditional data protection benefits from a long experience of adequacy assessments in the form of regulation and industry best practice guidelines, the ubicomp design space has many more "degrees of freedom." In addition to retention time and disclosure policies typically used in traditional data protection, the ubicomp design space also includes proxemics, architectonic features (enclosure, delimitation, etc.), and social variables (e.g., whether it is a public space or not). The following analytic method can help designers master this overwhelming collection of concerns and meet informed decisions.
Interface and cognitive affordances, sensing modes and management policies are fundamental for the adequacy test. For example, the Article 29 Working Party (the European advisory body on data protection) discusses the case of a doorbell camera, used to show visitors standing at the door. Here, the fundamental features are the shot angle and cone and activation mode of the camera [11] . A narrow-angle lens, pointed at space outside the path of unrelated passersby, and activated by the visitor pressing the doorbell, is acceptable in most social settings. Indeed such installations are deemed legitimate and appropriate. Conversely, a remotely controlled system, capturing an ample portion of the street or corridor, does not provide a satisfactory compromise of benefit and burden, because it collects much unnecessary and potentially private information.
The analysis of these privacy-impacting features is a complex activity, and possible techniques depend on the technology as well as the deployment setting. We present here a procedure which does not account for the effects of temporal and social circumstances on design, but can be used in many cases, and is based on the following five steps:
What are the characteristics of the privacy-impacting design features? E.g., impacted spatial area, such as microphone range or lens angle, measurement resolution, level of aggregation of data, user interface affordances like access interfaces and operation mode.
How are design features described as variables?
By type (either discrete or continuous) and range (e.g., minimum and maximum, selection of choices), considering the characteristics of the employed technology.
What are the values or ranges of each variable critical
to the success of the application? E.g., the accuracy of a location technology.
What are the values or ranges of each variable which
impact on the privacy of all stakeholders? E.g., primary and non-primary users.
What compromise is possible between the requirements of steps 3 and 4, considering their relative validity?
The characteristics identified in step 1 above include a very wide assortment of design features. Privacy principles such as the FIPS can be used to generate guidelines and identify relevant design features specific to the application at hand. Here we list five types of features which have been particularly relevant in our experience:
• Quantitative measures of sensor precision. In the case of location sensing, for example, lower resolution is associated with greater uncertainty, which increases plausible deniability, and thus indirectly, user privacy.
• Quantitative measures of sensor reach. For example, the range of a microphone can be modulated responding to information minimization principles.
• Interface affordances for data retrieval. Access cost to collected information (e.g., required time) can be considered in an adequacy assessment. As access cost increases, the number of accesses decreases, increasing privacy.
• Technology visibility. Visible cues of personal data collection, increases privacy by enabling knowledge (thus supporting informed consent dynamics and selfrestraint).
• Preexisting understanding of the used technology and metaphors. Cultural baggage can reinforce or interfere with the understanding of their properties and operation.
The concept of privacy proposed above differs from traditional security approaches (e.g., UNIX access control) which always produce a binary outcome: either access is granted or not. Rather, we view privacy-enhancing design as risk management on information abuse, linking the cost of accessing personal information by an abuser, the perceived benefit deriving from abuse, and the cost sustained by the victim of such abuse. This fuzzy concept of privacy is also present in the information asymmetry work by Jiang et al. [21] . In fact, the modulation of information flows is part of the adequacy assessment (and also supports the information minimization principle). However, designers have a wider range of design alternatives than just modulating information flows, including interface design options, as access cost to information, consent dynamics, which define a more general kind of "situational asymmetry."
We view interpersonal privacy as a negotiation process, a concept adapted to IT design by Palen and Dourish [31] , who raise questions regarding everyday privacy negotiation and its relation to technology. Our method helps to understand which balances are appropriate and how to implement them in practice-i.e., what affordances to build into services and how to design them. Not all domains afford appropriate negotiation dynamics by users (e.g., automatic/background systems); in such cases, designers should prepackage negotiated solutions in their designs.
In step 2, the identified characteristics must be described by indicating what their variability range is, and whether there are relationships amongst them (e.g., design tradeoffs, cost tradeoffs, or external bounds). Clearly, design characteristics are not always amenable to such a reduction; while a quantitative description of design features simplifies the subsequent proportionality arguments, the designer must be prepared to consider more complex, or non-quantifiable, characteristics; but it should be at least possible to determine the bounds of the design space.
Bellotti and Sellen's work on videoconferencing systems [4] is extremely interesting in this context. Their exploration of the design space, characterized by features such as feedback and control structures, constitutes an example of how the first two phases of the adequacy process can be conducted. While that work focuses on a single "design space dimension", proportionality supports a broader range of design features in addition to feedback/control.
In step 3 the designer must select which characteristics and values are critical to the success of the application: what characteristics are hard as opposed to soft requirements.
Similarly in step 4, the relationship between design characteristics, their values and the privacy burden to all involved stakeholders is evaluated. These determinations can be reached through a vast mix of design tools, as long as an adequate rationale is provided. The confidence that these tools provide is key to the adequacy process at this stage. Deployment, usability studies, interviews and analytic tools provide the firmest grounds to determine appropriate ranges for design variables. However, any design process is permeated by countless decisions made by the designer which cannot all be conclusively accounted for. What the proportionality method calls for is that these judgments be made explicit and used as afforded by the value of and confidence in the supporting evidence.
Finally, in step 5 these assessments are compared, and individual proportionality judgments are made for each variable. The determination of a compromise in the affordances space constitutes the kernel of the design method. Various techniques can be used for making such determinations, e.g., requirements negotiation models such as WinWin [6] . For simplicity, we do not discuss how to manage mutual effects between individual adequacy judgments. There are a variety of possible options in case the ranges identified in steps 3 and 4 clash.
• It might be necessary to decrease the success requirements of step 3.
• The designer might reconsider privacy goals identified in step 4 (by yielding to the other party's interests).
• It might be possible to reconsider any specific application goal that is bound to requirements that cannot be satisfied (in extreme cases, the designer might resort to abandoning the specific application altogether).
• The designer may choose a different technology for meeting the same application goals.
The case study below illustrates both cases in which requirement negotiation was straightforward, and cases in which reaching a compromise required to modify success or privacy requirements.
SAMPLE APPLICATION: THE PERSONAL AUDIO LOOP
The design method described above has been used within our research group to analyze and design a mobile memory aid application, known as the Personal Audio Loop, or PAL [17] . That article contains an in-depth discussion of the design process. We illustrate here how the proportionality method aided the development of a working application with market potential.
PAL was motivated by the everyday experience of conversational breakdowns, as people try to remember something that was said in the recent past, such as the topic of a conversation before being interrupted, or a name or number briefly heard in situations of high cognitive load. The device (Fig. 2) allows the user to replay, at any moment in time, any sound that was heard in the recent past, up to a defined maximum time span, or buffer length (for example, up to 1 hour in the past). Sound is stored in a circular buffer: audio older than the buffer length is automatically overwritten and cannot be replayed. PAL is integrated in a cell phone, but the device only records sound from the environment, and not phone conversations. The user can replay the recording, rewind and fast forward through it or jump to bookmarked positions ("earmarks"). The stored audio can be heard either through the loudspeaker on the phone, or through the external speaker/mike.
Our own experience and informal conversations with others suggested that this service could be helpful in numerous everyday situations to various categories of users, such as busy professionals and people with memory dysfunctions. We were also acutely aware of the potential concerns people could raise, knowing that a device was constantly recording their conversations. We thus set out to analytically study how the service would be used and what the adoption issues were through 1) a laboratory study to probe interface usability, 2) a diary study targeted at understanding why, when and how people would find PAL useful, followed by interviews and targeted surveys, 3) legal analysis, and 4) a deployment over several weeks. In the following analysis, we adopt a utilitarian (as opposed to principle-driven) stance towards design [33] . Moreover, we assume that the implementation is trusted, i.e., that the implementation addresses standard security issues such as tampering with application code or installing unauthorized software.
Legitimacy. During the design of this application this issue was approached at two levels: the usefulness of the memory aid was assessed by deploying a diary study which suggested that participants would use the application often (avg. 3.5 times per week) and for relevant purposes, significantly and positively impacting their daily activities, by reducing the time of recalling forgotten details of conversations such as phone numbers, names, and lists of items. The deployment of four PAL prototypes confirmed these observations, providing increased validity to the diary study.
Questions were raised during early design regarding the burden imposed on conversation partners and third parties; during deployment, in most cases, conversation partners did not object to the use of PAL after the user had explained its purpose and characteristics (i.e., the limited retention time). However, users also failed to inform all conversation partners of the presence of PAL, to avoid repeatedly explaining its features. In some social settings, they simply avoided mentioning and using the device altogether, or they turned it off spontaneously. Thus, deployment seemed to confirm that users adopt self-regulating behaviors with regard to their conversation partners' privacy. However, the small scale of the deployment left open questions, including issues regarding contextualization and adjudication, which we are currently trying to address in a follow-up study. Concluding, we posited that PAL would pass a legitimacy judgment, if the user had a need for a memory aid (e.g., due to memory dysfunctions), and the setting of use could sustain the residual risk of misuse, which should be verified through an extended controlled deployment.
Appropriateness. We claimed that:
• the proposed technical solution (i.e., open mike audio recording on mobile device) is by far the most costeffective. We considered alternatives such as instrumenting the environment with microphones and transmitting digital audio wirelessly for recording on devices worn on the user's body and fully infrastructural, off-body, recording and storage. Furthermore, continuous operation is justified because PAL, as a memory aid, is useful exactly when one does not expect it; if the user had to trigger the recording intentionally, then PAL would not be any different from a pocket tape recorder, and it would not provide the unique benefit that users found so compelling.
• The application is not modifiable by the user, is singlepurpose, and does not allow the storage of the recording past the buffer length time. The need for formative real-world deployment was confirmed by our discovery that users had found a way around the retention time limitation by indefinitely pausing the recording. This showed that the users had a strong need for a audio notepad, in addition to a memory aid; however, exercising due diligence within the proportionality assessment, we decided to remove this re-purposing feature in the final version. We also discovered that participants were using PAL to relay information between different conversation partners, and for proving points in discussion (e.g., "you said that…"); in our opinion, these emergent uses would be best curbed by a combination of social pressure and retention time reduction.
• A technical analysis aimed at finding alternatives with regards to reducing the burden on conversation partners did not provide any further solutions.
The observations in the second point constitute compelling evidence that real-world evaluation of ubiquitous computing technologies within a cyclic development process is indispensable to control emergent or co-evolved behaviors, for legal, ethical or other reasons. In summary, we assessed that the selected solution would be appropriate for meeting application goals, although our observations raised the issue of trust with respect to opaque technology. Adequacy. The analysis of the design space of this simple application provided the following list of relevant interface affordances and information policies. This list was derived through iterative analysis by three expert designers.
1. microphone range; expressed as a spherical space which can be modulated in continuous manner (characterization is indicated in short form below);
2. buffer length and retention time (in PAL the two variables are joined); continuous, time;
3. access and browsing facilities; selection of (tape-like browsing, skimming, i.e., replaying at faster speed);
4. audio output channel; selection of (headphone, external loudspeaker);
5. ability to set "bookmarks" at significant moments in time to facilitate search; selection of (yes, no);
6. permanent audio storage; selection of (yes, no);
7. activity notification cue to the conversation partner; selection of (visual, audio, none);
8. placement of the microphone relative to the user; selection of (any location where the device can be attached to the user body or clothing, or headset connected to device; headset in clothing or apparel);
9. appearance of the mobile device; selection of (any mobile recording device). Moreover, features can be expressed in different ways: microphone range can be measured in meters as radius, but it is more helpful to use proxemics categories (i.e., intimate, personal, social, public [16] ) or to reference human sound perception. Finally, some compromises might be infeasible. Consider feature 9: on the one hand, users do not want extra devices; on the other hand, cell phones are not usually associated with audio recording. The case is similar to the recent appearance of "camera-phones." Unable to reach a design compromise, we derived a deployment condition, which should be assessed through summative evaluation.
While legal analysis is not in the scope of the present discussion, we mention that a preliminary assessment found that PAL falls into a gray area of EU data protection law (Directive 95/46/EC), and might comply with it given a favorable DPA opinion, whereas strict interpretation of surveillance and wiretapping legislation in parts of the US with "two-party consent" (i.e., that all parties present must consent to the recording) might directly challenge the application's legality [17] .
In synthesis, applying the proportionality design method to this application allowed us to formulate a strong argument in favor of the usefulness and acceptability of PAL, given specific safeguards and conditions on its use. This result was not granted from the beginning: the initial proposal for this applications was met with much skepticism by other researchers in our institution, both regarding its legality and user acceptance. We believe that the above example shows how the proportionality design method, used within a usercentered, iterative development process, resulted not only in the careful design of the user interface and information policies, but also greatly improved our understanding of the associated uses and risks, and of the conditions and corrective actions necessary within the deployment environment.
CONCLUSIONS
Proportionality is a straightforward principle widely used in the legal community for judging upon the merits and tradeoffs of privacy-sensitive IT applications. We developed an original design method, motivated by proportionality and compatible with iterative development process models, that can help building ubicomp applications which are more respectful of the privacy of users and stakeholders, and are rigorously justified from a social standpoint. To support this claim, we showed how we used the method to design a potentially contentious memory aid service which has undergone significant user testing and deployment.
The proportionality method, in its three phases (legitimacy, appropriateness, adequacy), adds little overhead to existing user-centered design process models. It does not mandate the use of specific data gathering tools or techniques, although we have suggested some which we see as particularly suitable. It does not catalogue guidelines such as "minimize data collection" or "enable consent dynamics", although such guidelines can be employed for identifying relevant design questions. Rather, this method proposes a way of managing privacy conflicts. With it, HCI practitioners can reach well-reasoned determinations on how much data are the minimal data, what choices are the appropriate ones, and what forms of consent dynamics the applications must support. The method does not guarantee a solution to any design problem involving privacy balances,-in fact, it might even result in abandoning a design-but provides:
• a systematic, structured process that can be used to make privacy judgments relative to users and groups; • an indication of what questions of social relevance must be addressed to create acceptable applications and services; • a common vocabulary for talking about privacy; and
• an indication of the risks caused by the application.
Concluding, we do not seek utopian agreement by all users and designers involved in ubicomp applications with privacy implications; more realistically, we strive to ground adjudication on convincing and comprehensive reasoning based on legal precedents, industry best practice and user and social understanding. A rigorous stance to privacy does not curb development; quite the contrary, serious scrutiny increases the chances of acceptance and ultimately success.
